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CONCERNING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A FANONIAN ANALYSIS OF COLONIZING THE 
FEMALE BODY  
 
TRACEY NICHOLLS 
LEWIS UNIVERSITY, USA 
 
Abstract: This paper explores various manifestations of violence against women in the 
United States through a Fanonian analysis of colonizing practices. It argues that the hostility 
towards women which has been so evident in American public policy over the past year can 
be understood as a large-scale, abstract version of more concrete applications of social 
control still pervasive in interpersonal relations. Understanding misogyny and objectification 
of women through Fanon’s theory of colonization shows us that the philosophical basis of 
American attitudes about gender roles and gendered public policies is not the “pro-life” 
orientation promoted in political rhetoric, but the deliberate application of a politics of fear.  
Keywords: violence, colonization, public policy, women’s well-being, intimate partner abuse. 
 
 
The rhetoric of American exceptionalism typically functions to exalt the United States by 
casting all other societies as “Other,” that is, as lesser. In the case of contrasts with 
developing nations, exceptionalist pretensions often cast these other societies as less 
capable of constituting and maintaining effective forms of social organization. When 
explaining the sense in which the United States is exceptional as an advanced economy, 
however, the other states – European nations in particular – are depicted as less 
committed to values the articulator of exceptionalism assumes to be necessary conditions 
of human flourishing. U.S. superiority is asserted inconsistently, and usually without any 
sign of awareness that it is inconsistent, as a commitment to hyper-individualism and as a 
commitment to greater inclusion of all people on the grounds of their social value and a 
deeply-rooted tradition of communitarianism.1 Even where there is no explicit contrast 
                                               
1
 “America is a great place because there’s a fantastic fusion of two forces: individualism and community. 
When you look at communities where there’s been a natural disaster or where there’s been a terrible terrorist 
attack, what you see is Americans running towards each other, not running away […] And I don’t think there’s 
anywhere on the Earth quite like it,” says Martin Bashir (2012), opinion show host for the cable television news 
network MSNBC. See 
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being made with other nation-states, this implicit claim that the United States is a society 
more respectful of the moral value of all of its inhabitants dominates the public-sphere 
discourse. We see this distorted national self-perception in the newly-adopted cliché used 
by politicians to express support for marriage equality – that you are American “no matter 
who you love”2 – a long overdue attempt to leap out of more hateful elements of 
homophobic and heteronormative discourse through American exceptionalism’s 
characteristic appeal to ahistoricity. What this rhetoric obscures (in addition to those past 
decades in which sexuality was rigidly policed and whom one loved mattered very much) 
is an obsessive discursive focus on a stereotypical “mainstream” that is fast becoming a 
demographic minority – the white middle class – and a deliberate inattention to people 
who do not fit that stereotype: people of color and people too economically disadvantaged 
to lay claim to membership in the elastic category, “middle class.” My intention in this 
article is to show that the “xenophobic manipulation of women’s rights” that is the thematic 
focus of this issue appears in American life both as a violence of abstraction at the level of 
public discourse and as a dismissal of women’s security needs and bodily integrity at the 
level of everyday individual lives. I see this application of abstract (attenuated) violence in 
discourse and concrete violence in marginalized communities as similar to the distinction 
Frantz Fanon makes in The Wretched of the Earth concerning the differential treatment of 
the “settler” and the “native” in colonized communities, and I shall therefore argue that the 
logic of colonization is a fruitful tool to illustrate uneven or contradictory responses to 
gendered violence in the United States. 
At the level of public policy-making and national discourse, there is a stated 
commitment to defending selective rights that women are deemed to have: not 
reproductive rights, but the right to be safe from violence. But this discursive defense of 
women’s right to a life free of violence is coupled with an assumption that this protection 
will cover a particular type of victim, the middle-class woman who, despite her gender, is 
enough like the nation’s lawmakers that she can be seen as deserving – indeed, that she 
can be seen at all. The cornerstone of legal safeguards against gendered violence, the 
Violence Against Women Act (abbreviated VAWA), is a piece of federal legislation that 
mandates recognition of domestic violence and sexual assault as crimes in all of the 
states, territories, and tribal lands within the United States and provides funding for 
programs to combat violence (National Network To End Domestic Violence – NNEDV, 
2013). As is sometimes the case with federal legislation in the United States, VAWA – first 
                                                                                                                                              
http://info.msnbc.com/_news/2012/08/16/13319372-martin-bashirs-new-lean-forward-ad?lite.  
2
 For example, in a commencement address given to graduates at Barnard College, President Barack Obama 
spoke of “that brilliant, radically simple idea of America that no matter who you are or what you look like, no 
matter who you love or what God you worship, you can still pursue your own happiness” (May 14, 2012). See: 
https://barnard.edu/headlines/transcript-speech-president-barack-obama#overlay-context=headlines/citation-
evan-wolfson . 
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passed in 1994 – bears the quirk of an expiry date, such that it periodically needs to be 
reauthorized. The recent controversy surrounding reauthorization demonstrates how 
difficult it can be, in this political environment, to extend protection to women who are not 
part of the social mainstream. Reauthorization was effected in both chambers of the 
Congress without incident in 2000 and in 2005, but in 2010 it ran headlong into an 
ideologically polarized legislature during an election year (National Domestic Violence 
Hotline, n.d.; Harper, 2012). The significant stumbling block was disagreement between 
the upper and lower chambers of the legislature – the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, respectively – that had resulted in two distinct versions of the 
reauthorization bill. The Senate version proposed extending protection to three groups of 
women who had previously been either excluded or inadequately recognized – Native 
American women, undocumented immigrants, and members of LGBTQ communities – 
whereas the House version sustained the inattention to some of these groups that had 
marked previous incarnations of the Act (Harper, 2012). In essence, the House 
reauthorization bill was a declaration that some women deserve to be protected from 
violent crime, and others do not.  
VAWA’s continued legal authority is crucial precisely because it is a piece of 
legislation that has an undeniably successful track record in achieving its goal of reducing 
gender-based violence. Government reporting outlets and independent advocacy groups 
differ somewhat in the exact figures they put forth, but they agree that there has been an 
increase in both charges filed and arrests made in the areas of domestic violence and 
sexual assault since VAWA was first introduced (whitehouse.gov, 2013; NNEDV, 2013). 
They report reductions in intimate-partner homicides ranging from 34 percent to 35 
percent in cases of female victims and ranging from 46 percent and 57 percent in cases of 
male victims, in addition to an overall decrease in the rate of non-fatal intimate-partner 
violence by about 67 percent (whitehouse.gov, 2013; NNEDV, 2013). Federal mandates 
which direct the states to harmonize their laws with VAWA protections have resulted in 
reforms to state law that now treat acquaintance rape and spousal rape as seriously as 
so-called stranger rape, that have made stalking a crime in all states, that authorize 
immediate arrest of suspected perpetrators by police officers who respond to situations in 
which they have probable cause to believe domestic violence has occurred, and that 
attach criminal penalties to violations of civil protection orders (whitehouse.gov, 2013). 
VAWA also provides federal funding for specialized training of law enforcement officers, 
prosecutors, and judges to educate them about domestic violence and sexual assault 
concerns, coordinates law enforcement responses with social service agencies and 
community groups, offers housing and immigration status protections to victims, and 
founded the National Domestic Violence Hotline – which 92 percent of its callers report is 
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their first attempt to seek help (whitehouse.gov, 2013). Failure to reauthorize the Act 
would have eliminated funding for investigative and prosecutorial resources in matters of 
violent crimes against women, provisions for restitution, and the possibility of civil redress 
for women whose cases were not prosecuted in criminal courts (Harper, 2012). 
Although debates about the act have reflected a conservative bias towards the needs 
of white middle-class women, VAWA’s successive reauthorizations have pushed against 
the discursive trend of focusing attention and resources on the middle class by extending 
the protections of the 1994 Act to immigrant women whose right to remain in the country 
might have been jeopardized by leaving an abusive sponsoring partner (2000 
reauthorization) and to women living in government-subsidized housing whose decision to 
leave an abusive partner might have resulted in eviction or denial of housing (2005 
reauthorization), a continued commitment to inclusiveness that has arguably been part of 
the long delay in a reauthorization process originally scheduled to take place in 2010 but 
only signed into law by President Obama in 2013 (National Domestic Violence Hotline, 
n.d.). The need to protect other groups of women – Native American women, 
undocumented immigrants, and members of LGBTQ communities – is as evident as the 
reluctance of some legislators to acknowledge them as worthy of the shelter the law has 
to offer. Native American women, for instance, suffer a homicide rate that, on some 
reservations, is as much as 10 times higher than the national average, and statistics 
compiled by the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) suggest that roughly 39 
percent of these women will suffer violence in the home (NCAI, 2012). The protection that 
was proposed in the Senate bill and objected to in the House version will now make it 
possible for them to bring charges against non-Native American abusers in tribal courts – 
a vital protection when one considers 2000 Census statistics showing that 56 percent of 
Native American women are living on tribal lands with non-Native American spouses or 
domestic partners (NCAI, 2012). Until this added protection was included in the 2013 
reauthorization, Native American women seeking legal redress could not get it from the 
courts governing tribal lands, who were prohibited from trying non-Native offenders 
(Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 1978). They had to appeal to federal or state 
prosecutors in distant communities who declined to prosecute 52 percent of cases 
involving violence against Native American women (NCAI, 2012). Despite the very 
specific need of Native American women for legislative protection, VAWA provisions 
giving them the right to press charges against non-Native partners in tribal courts for 
violence or abuse committed on tribal lands have been dismissed as special treatment to 
which they are not entitled by many of the white male lawmakers who represent electoral 
districts containing tribal lands – even by one of the two Native men who represent such 
districts in the Congress (Bogado, 2013). 
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The debate on what protections should be in the 2013 reauthorization of VAWA is 
illustrative of two distinct theoretical constructs that I see as providing parallel 
explanations of the hostility and inaction that movements to end gender-based violence 
must confront: first, the violence of abstraction that is the public policy, public sphere 
mirror image of everyday marginalization that peace studies theorists, following Johann 
Galtung (1969), have labelled “structural violence,” and second, the colonial structures 
theorized by Frantz Fanon in his landmark analysis The Wretched of the Earth. The notion 
of a violence of abstraction is developed by phenomenologist Jonathan Wender in his 
book Policing and the Poetics of Everyday Life as a particular type of dehumanization that 
results when those in authority view human beings in crisis as problems to be solved 
(Wender, 2008: 90). Reflecting on the ways this “logic of problematization” asserts itself in 
the daily work of the law enforcement officer, Wender contends that “the most 
discomforting aspect of the police bureaucracy is not its power of physical coercion but its 
ability to encipher a human being into an abstract assemblage of data” (ibidem: 107). 
Reduction of people to data, to statistics, to percentages is a devaluing erasure of their 
complexity that is made possible through abstraction – in much the same way that 
troubling histories of racism, sexism, and homophobia in the United States are erased by 
the ahistorical rhetoric I noted in my introductory comments about the putative equality of 
all Americans, “no matter who you are, […] no matter who you love” (Obama, 2012). 
Violence of abstraction depicts women solely as victims, in need of protection by men and 
by putatively masculine institutions like rule of law. In offering this critique, I do not mean 
to suggest that the law ought to overlook crimes and injuries that might be committed 
against persons of either gender. What I am contending is that debates about which 
women deserve to be protected begin from an assumption that women, as a class, need 
to be protected by others – which is to say, following Marx, that we cannot protect 
ourselves.3 This assumption of diminished capacity replicates the structural inequality we 
find in Fanon’s analysis of the colonial state – women are less capable than men – and 
invites us to see women as inherently inferior, rather than seeing the reality of a society 
that subjugates women through application of random, yet pervasive, acts and threats of 
violence against us. 
Colonialism, Fanon tells us, is characterized by pervasive violence – both by the state 
and by the settlers set up as the colony’s elite against the marginalized natives – and 
characterized by governing institutions that construct and preserve inequality (Fanon, 
1963: 29-30). Ruling others, demanding that they serve your interests to the exclusion of 
their own, can only be achieved through application of violence. And keeping the people 
                                               
3
 What Marx said, about the peasant class most economically marginalized in nineteenth-century France, was 
that “[t]hey cannot represent themselves, they must be represented” (Marx, 1994: 200). 
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you have colonized subservient is most likely to be successful if you can convince them 
that they are, objectively, of lesser value than the group who rule. Fanon asserts that 
colonized natives – first conquered, then exploited and simultaneously made to feel 
inferior by the colonizing settlers – are governed by the naked force of colonial institutions 
such as checkpoints and police brutality in contradistinction to the veiled force of 
education and acculturation that shapes the lives of the settlers (ibidem: 31). The 
Wretched of the Earth concerns itself with both the logic of colonization as it is practiced 
by colonizing settlers who use violence as a dehumanizing force to break the community 
relations – the solidarity – of the colonized natives and the psychology of colonization as it 
breaks down the confidence and sense of self of the native. Because of this, Fanon’s 
analysis seems to me to provide the most fruitful theoretical bridge between the violence 
of abstraction that allows legislation guaranteeing women’s bodily integrity to become a 
political football and the structural violence that marks the everyday lives of women (and 
their male allies) who survive and resist the gendered violences of sexual assault and 
intimate partner abuse. 
While it might be tempting to read my connection of gendered violence to Fanon’s 
analysis as a metaphorical adoption of the concept of colonization, I intend my 
deployment of the concept to be understood literally. As I read Fanon, his deconstruction 
of colonization and his development of a theory of decolonization are grounded in an 
analysis of power relations that is as applicable to gender as it is to conquest of foreign 
territories. He draws together political dominance, economic exploitation, and a program 
of psychological destabilization that convinces the conquered of their incapacity to resist. 
To speak of the gender dominance that others theorize as patriarchy using the language 
of colonization helps me to see the commonalities in how violence is transmuted into 
power in various contexts that would otherwise be separated into distinct categories of 
gender relations and geopolitical concerns.4 Notably, reading gender violence in the 
United States through Fanon reveals the normalization of violence against women that is 
presented to men – it’s just the way of the world, something that happens, rather than 
something that some people (statistically, mostly men) do to other people (statistically, 
mostly women) – as an analogue of the normalization of violence against natives that 
settlers in colonies live with as a matter of fact. Even as I see this colonial attitude 
surfacing at the macro level of society in policy discussions of how to address violence 
against women, I see it also at the micro level, in the lives of individual women, in the 
                                               
4
 My insistence on linking imperial conquest and patriarchy is grounded in philosophical endorsement of bell 
hooks’ argument that patriarchal domination is not the foundation of all oppression and would not lead 
necessarily to an end to violence against women and gender subordination. Instead, hooks contends, 
patriarchal domination is one manifestation of a more pervasive “politics of domination” that is learned in the 
home through exercise (and often, misuse) of parental authority, a phenomenon that women participate in “as 
perpetrators as well as victims” (hooks, 1989: 20). 
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pervasiveness and diversity of control mechanisms that continue to structure women’s 
lives as dependent upon men and dependent, for their safety and well-being, on 
maintaining attitudes of passivity towards the world. Why does the dominant message 
transmitted to women and girls stress their value as sexual objects, rather than, say, their 
value as scholars, athletes, or even sexual agents? And what connection does this 
sexualization of women have to violence against us? 
In part, the explanation for reducing women’s value to our reproductive capacities and 
sexual attractiveness lies in the history of patriarchal political institutions, the usefulness of 
compliant women to a system that Adrienne Rich (1986) has theorized as “compulsory 
heterosexuality.” The commentary Rich offers on Kathleen Gough’s eight characteristics 
of male power elaborates many violent tactics – from rape to genital mutilation – that 
serve to convince women of their vulnerability and the futility of adopting any attitude other 
than passive acceptance of male authority (from “The Origin of the Family,” quoted in 
Rich, 1986). Rich’s elaborated examples of Gough’s inventory of characteristics range 
over strategic sexual terrorism, exploitation of women’s production and reproduction, 
withholding of education and information that might allow women to see themselves as 
autonomous agents, and promotion of cultural values that inculcate female inferiority and 
male superiority. The blend of calculated application of violence and indoctrination of 
distorted self-evaluations and worldviews that we find in Rich’s account of the 
heteronormative society mirrors the colonial structures we find described in Fanon’s 
account of occupation by the rapacious imperial state. 
This oscillation between external and internal control mechanisms – between violence 
and indoctrination – is equally visible in the lives of individual women, particularly when 
considering how expectations for our romantic and domestic lives shape our experiences. 
In the United States, understanding of romantic relationships and domestic partnerships 
has changed over the last few decades in at least two very important ways. First, the 
increasing influence of feminist thought and theorizing about power relations have given 
us a greater awareness of dysfunctional relationships, from unhealthy attachment, to 
stalking, to overt domestic abuse. Systemic abuse in relationships, Nancy Hirschmann 
suggests, functions like colonization. She contends that: 
 
the more complete and effective a system of oppression is, the less aware of it as 
oppression its victims are; a truly successful system of oppression will have 
encoded itself into the worldview of the colonized, become their reality, and 
constructed their inner visions of themselves, social and political relations, nature, 
the world. (Hirschmann, 1996: 139)  
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Second, in fundamentally changing the ways in which relationships are conducted, 
advances in communications technology like cell phone texting – which effectively 
eliminates the publicity of conversations taking place in public places, and consequently 
the ability of bystanders to intervene in conflicts – are blurring the line between external 
and internal control. The emergence of texting as a means of constant communication in 
relationships has facilitated its development as a mechanism through which one 
relationship partner may exert control over the behavior of the other, and may perpetuate 
systemic abuse in ways that make it more difficult for the abused partner to recognize the 
communication as abuse.  
One helpful place to start thinking about the kind of intimate partner abuse that blurs 
the line between violence and indoctrination is Kathleen Ferraro’s genealogy of the 
discourse on domestic violence. This term, she notes, “is a code for physical and 
emotional brutality within intimate relationships, usually heterosexual” (Ferraro, 1996: 77). 
She identifies the contemporary “domestic violence” discourse she is concerned with 
analyzing as emerging in the United States “in the early 1970s, along with the second 
wave of the women’s movement” (ibidem: 78). What particularly interests Ferraro about 
our thinking on domestic abuse is the way it has been taken up and altered, from a 
progressive feminist discourse concerned with the safety of women into a law-and-order 
discourse concerning the criminality of domestic assault. “It is possible to oppose 
‘domestic violence’ and at the same time oppose all other efforts to restructure relations of 
dominance, including women’s subordination,” she observes (ibidem). The originary voice 
of progressive feminism, which seeks to challenge the male dominance grounding the 
conservative “family values” worldview, has, she thinks, been drowned out by the crime-
control perspective that entrenched itself in the Reagan through Clinton eras as the 
standard response to social ills (ibidem: 89). 
It is important, however, to notice that Ferraro is not just engaging in a simplistic left-
wing attack on the right. She endorses the view that perpetrators of assault, domestic or 
otherwise, should face the criminal justice system (ibidem: 87). The problem she identifies 
in the law-and-order strand of discourse around domestic violence is that law and order is 
effectively where the conversation stops. Public policy and public spending are focused on 
arrest and imprisonment of individual criminals, and far too little attention is given to “the 
legal structures upholding male-dominated nuclear households” and the needs of women 
trying to leave abusive relationships: employment at a living wage, safe and affordable 
housing, affordable healthcare and daycare, and protection of families who have 
“irregular” immigration status (ibidem: 81-82, 89).5  
                                               
5
 Kimberlé Crenshaw makes similar arguments about the failure of public policy to address the needs of 
abused women, with particular attention to the ways that women of color are burdened, in “Mapping the 
Concerning Violence against Women: A Fanonian Analysis of Colonizing the Female Body  
178 
While Ferraro points out the limitations of criminal justice discourse, she also 
recognizes the ways in which feminist discourse has failed to adequately explain the 
complexity of these crimes committed in the privacy of the home. “Like other aspects of 
early second wave feminism,” she contends, “domestic violence discourse has been 
oriented toward the construction of a unified image” (ibidem: 78). She explains: 
 
Although the unidimensional image of “woman” in feminist thought and movement 
has undergone major revisions in response to critiques from those who felt silenced 
or misrepresented, the domestic violence discourse has remained moored to 
assumptions of homogeneity among those who are battered and those who batter. 
(ibidem) 
 
This construction of a “type” of woman who is battered and a “type” of man who is an 
abuser is a particularly problematic stereotype because it encourages identification among 
some, at the expense of alienation among others, and with implications for whether and 
how this social ill is taken seriously.6 Such divisiveness in turn breeds an attempt to unify 
that, in its presumed unification, simply perpetuates the alienation of those who find 
themselves unrepresented. This is yet another instantiation of the violence of abstraction. 
Even Ferraro, however, in the course of her very careful analysis, accepts some 
claims fairly uncritically – notably the idea that because the larger category of intimate 
partner relationships in which one finds domestic violence includes dating relationships, all 
intimate partner relationships can be theorized as a single model (ibidem). This is a point 
that needs to be considered much more carefully: there are some important differences 
between dating and live-in relationships that may well be reasons why women who are 
being abused by partners they live apart from might not see themselves as being abused. 
Asserting control and manipulating a partner through text messaging, for example, might 
not be seen as part of an abusive relationship because it is not overtly violent. Indeed, one 
of the primary messages about domestic violence that self-help/outreach websites strive 
to convey is that abusive relationships are fundamentally a matter of control, not violence 
(Turning Point, 2006).7 I would argue there is another way to frame discussions of intimate 
                                                                                                                                              
Margins” (Crenshaw, 1994: 95-98). This section contains an excellent discussion of the obstacles faced by 
immigrant women who are – or understand themselves to be – dependent on their husbands for their legal 
status. 
6
 Perceiving domestic violence as a problem among the poor encourages members of the middle-class to 
disregard its existence in their homes, and permits political silence on behalf of the governing class. On the 
other hand, outreach efforts that attempt to promote domestic violence as a danger in all families have skewed 
public service messages and community resources towards middle-class women and neglected marginalized 
women in poor minority communities. See Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1994) article for this argument. 
7
 I cite this self-help/outreach site as one instance of the many such sites that present themselves as 
accessible resources for people in abusive or controlling relationships. It offers nuanced information about a 
variety of concerns – dating violence, the power and control mechanisms that counselors offer as warning 
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partner abuse. Instead of making a distinction between control and violence, and casting 
“control” as the defining characteristic of these relationships, I think there is more 
discursive space opened up for critical analysis of this social phenomenon if we see it as 
part of the social dysfunction that peace studies theorists identify as “structural violence.” 
One theorist in this area, Kathleen Ho, defines structural violence as “the avoidable 
disparity between the potential ability to fulfill basic needs and their actual fulfillment” (Ho, 
2007: 1). Her discussion of structural violence as a human rights violation focuses on 
questions of poverty, but the claim that social and economic inequalities, because they 
are avoidable, constitute a systemic violence against those who are disadvantaged with 
respect to power is applicable to intimate partner abuse (ibidem: 4). The relative economic 
disadvantage of women in American society – evidenced by wage disparity and rates of 
poverty for female-headed single-parent households – and the social indoctrination that 
Rich identifies produce conditions of vulnerability for women that result in constrained 
agency (ibidem: 10). The structural violence of normalized abuse, control, and 
manipulation of women in relationships convinces them of their inability to act – producing 
conditions of learned helplessness structurally similar to the psychology of colonization 
Fanon describes – and forms the “lived experience” counterpart to the violence of 
abstraction that reduces the distinct legislative needs of different groups of women to a 
singular remedy protecting the stereotypical middle class woman from violence.  
To see intimate partner abuse as structural violence, however, is culturally difficult. 
Inability to even recognize that abuse can take place without the presence of overt 
violence is particularly acute in a cultural context like the United States, which 
romanticizes the “take-charge” man and the passive woman. Think, for instance, of the 
standard reaction of young female movie-goers to the romance depicted in the Twilight 
(2008) franchise: the adoration of Edward Cullen as a loyal and loving partner and the 
reading of his obsessive interest in Bella as evidence of his romantic character.8 Just as 
Edward’s intrusive actions – breaking into Bella’s bedroom to watch her sleep, for 
example – are presented as romantic longing, so too the tagline for the first film – “A 
teenage girl risks everything when she falls in love with a vampire” – conveys a message 
of heroic sacrifice on Bella’s part. The risk she takes is not, of course, presented as the 
risk a self-sufficient and capable young woman is faced with when she discovers the 
stalking impulses of the young man who has caught her eye. Instead, the “risk” is whether 
she can maintain her humanity in a relationship with a vampire, and the sacrifice she 
                                                                                                                                              
signs, advice for people thinking about leaving an abusive or controlling intimate partner, how to identify a 
healthy relationship – which reflect current thinking in the domestic violence crisis counseling community, in a 
format and language that are easy to understand. 
8
 See, for instance, the discussion of popular culture reactions to the film offered by Jonathan McIntosh in his 
guest blog post “What Would Buffy Do?” (McIntosh, 2009). 
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appears intent on making at the end of the film is precisely that humanity. She desires 
Edward so much and values her current self so little that she wants to become like her 
lover in order to be with him always. Disseminating this willingness to give up her life in 
order to be a mere part of his as a romantic ideal for young girls plays into the 
psychological indoctrination on which both patriarchal and colonial dominance depend, 
and plays into the interests of abusive and controlling men.  
In an effort to offer warning signs that one might be in an abusive relationship, some 
of the self-help and outreach information available on the Internet also interrogates our 
cultural confusion. Among the “early warning signs” are such actions as “constantly asks 
you where you are going, who you are with, etc.,” “cut[s] you off from friends and family,” 
and “monitors your clothing/make-up” (Turning Point, 2006). These are clearly attempts to 
control, but “women are taught to interpret [such actions] as caring, attentive, and 
romantic” (ibidem). One complicating factor in making determinations about whether a 
given relationship is abusive is depicted, but not interrogated, in Twilight. The desire to 
exert control may motivate the actions of abusers, but the abused partner is likely to 
recognize the relationship as unhealthy or undesirable only if, and to the extent that, she 
perceives it as constraining her capacity to choose for herself. If, as Twilight’s Bella does, 
she believes herself to be freely choosing the relationship, she will not recognize it, or its 
mechanisms, as abusive. In the case of “text control,”9 for example, the communication 
that is effectively consolidating the abuser’s control may well be interpreted by the abused 
as a means of nurturing the relationship and being available as an emotional resource to 
her partner. 
Nancy Hirschmann’s view is that this emphasis on the presence or absence of choice 
should be central to our definition of abuse. “[I]s not a key element in our labeling [a 
relationship] abusive the fact that a woman’s agency, her capacity to make choices and 
act on them, is being denied?,” she asks (Hirschmann, 1996: 127). For Hirschmann, the 
capacity for free choices implicates political conceptions of liberty. The difficulty that 
traditional theories of liberty have in explaining what freedom means in the context of 
abusive relationships proves we need to do more work building concrete experiences into 
abstract theories (ibidem: 128-129). Where theories of “negative liberty” denote “an 
absence of external constraints” (law, force, and other forms of coercion), “positive liberty” 
“attends to what might be called ‘internal barriers’: fears, addictions, compulsions that are 
at odds with my ‘true’ self can all inhibit my freedom” (ibidem: 129-130). Negative liberty 
                                               
9
 “Text-control” may not be the catchphrase under which this phenomenon eventually becomes widely known 
to the general public but it is important to begin attempts to label the behavior. In her analysis of domestic 
abuse, Andrea Westlund cites research showing that“‘[d]ate rape’ and ‘separation assault’ name phenomena 
women know from our own experience, but which remain invisible without names (Mahoney 1991, 68-69)” 
(Westlund, 1999: 1060). “The naming of such phenomena,” she claims, “challenges the norms that make them 
invisible” (ibidem). 
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would tell students who are being controlled by text messages from their partners “you 
could always turn off the phone” or “you’re not being forced to read and respond to the 
texts” (ibidem). 
For the purposes of this discussion, the compelling defect of negative liberty is its 
failure to grasp the insight drawn from strands of feminist moral philosophy which point to 
women being socialized into a moral worldview that privileges obligations over rights 
(ibidem: 128). The question of whether a woman “is […] free if she returns to (or stays 
with) her partner” assumes freedom as the only consideration and discounts the way 
obligation shapes our lives (ibidem: 127). As I suggested above, female students being 
“text-controlled” might, for instance, not experience a barrage of text messages as 
oppressive because they are more focused on a need to validate the thoughts and 
feelings of their relationship partner than on exercising a right to privacy. Indeed, they may 
be tempted to interpret text messaging technology as conferring upon them a freedom to 
stay in touch with their partners, rather than seeking freedom from being monitored by 
them. Positive liberty theories can account for motivations that seem freely chosen but in 
fact hamper our quality of life by explaining that “the immediate desires I have may 
frustrate my true will” (ibidem: 130). Hirschmann uses the example of eating disorders to 
explain this phenomenon of “inauthentic” choices that our true selves would not rationally 
make, and contends that frustrating these desires does not constrain freedom (ibidem). 
“[L]ock[ing] me out of the kitchen to prevent a binge” can enhance my liberty, she argues 
(ibidem). Although “control” is implicated differently in eating disorders and controlling 
relationships, we can in both cases make a distinction between immediate desires and the 
long-range desires of the true self. Making students shut off their phones in class might 
support their liberty by recognizing that the immediate desire to be in caring relationship 
may make girls and young women vulnerable to manipulation and control. This view 
understands women in our society to feel a strong incentive to adopt a model of femininity 
that is passive in the face of male authority. Young women today often deny that they hold 
this attitude but they nonetheless continue to engage in behaviors seemingly in collusion 
with this model of passive, sexually available femininity – the colonial attitude Hirschmann 
describes, an indoctrination of oppression that is so complete one does not recognize it in 
oneself.  
The most obvious defect of positive liberty is its paternalism. In delineating desires 
that belong to one’s true self and those that are “imposed,” one is essentially telling a 
young woman what her true self is – sometimes in opposition to what she will experience 
as her most heartfelt desires. Both negative liberty’s emphasis on “issues of consent, 
opportunity, and choice” and positive liberty’s emphasis “on relationship and community” – 
developing our capacities to contribute productively to our social networks – are important 
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to feminist attempts to expand women’s liberty in contemporary society, Hirschmann tells 
us (ibidem). “[W]hat domestic violence particularly highlights,” she claims, is “that choices 
are so deeply, fundamentally, and complexly constructed for women that the conventional 
understandings of liberty and restraint found in the positive-negative debate are 
inadequate to address women’s experiences” (ibidem: 136). This complex construction 
even shapes what is seen as a choice and what is not. In the explicit domestic violence 
Hirschmann is theorizing about, leaving the relationship – however vulnerable that may 
make a woman, economically, say, or in terms of immigration status – is a choice the 
battered woman could make, but her abuser’s “impulse” to behave violently towards her is 
not cast as a choice he makes (ibidem: 138).10 Rather, abusive men, she notes, frequently 
blame their “bad behavior” on alcohol, workplace stress, and alleged provocations on the 
part of the woman herself (ibidem). By the same token, we need to be careful that any 
educational outreach we engage in around “text-control” behaviors does not focus 
exclusively on the woman’s “choice” to respond, but also interrogates her partner’s choice 
to engage in threatening and manipulative behavior.  
Ultimately, Hirschmann thinks that women’s freedom is blocked by “patriarchy […] the 
social, legal, and economic control” of women by men that is normalized in our culture 
(ibidem: 140). She notes that: 
 
Depression, feelings of low self-worth and accompanying beliefs that the woman 
somehow deserved the violence, or guilt and the belief that she provoked the 
violence, are all too common and may keep women from leaving their abusers. 
These feelings often coincide with women’s holding of traditional values about 
women’s and men’s roles and the stigma of divorce. Indeed, women who feel guilt 
or shame may be reluctant to come forward at all or even to admit to themselves 
that they are battered women. (ibidem: 133) 
 
The continual return of feminist thinking on domestic violence and abusive relationships to 
matters of control – especially Hirschmann’s discussion of how an external worldview, 
imposed upon us, can change our perceptions of ourselves and our environment – invites 
us to consider the relevance of French philosopher Michel Foucault’s writings on power 
and social control. While Foucault’s concern is with the ways institutions shape us into the 
beings that serve their aims, the interesting thing about linking his description of discipline 
to Fanon’s description of colonization and Hirschmann’s observation of domestic violence 
as an internalization of systems of oppression is how well these accounts work together to 
                                               
10
 Kimberlé Crenshaw makes a related point about the ways the burden and blame of domestic violence fall 
more heavily on abused women than abusing men: the burden is “more readily interpreted as obliging women 
not to scream rather than obliging men not to hit” (Crenshaw, 1994: 103). 
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explain how domestic abuse functions.11 One of the points of convergence we see in both 
Foucault’s theory of discipline and the cycle of domestic abuse is the deliberately early 
exercise of power so that mere threats can have the same controlling effect later on. 
Foucault concurs with Beccaria and other reformers of the criminal system that, to be 
effective, “[t]he penalty must be made to conform as closely as possible to the nature of 
the offence, so that the fear of punishment diverts the mind from the road along which the 
prospect of an advantageous crime was leading it” (Foucault, 1995: 104). In the case of 
domestic abuse, the “crime” in question would of course be any autonomous action on the 
part of the abused that threatens the abuser’s ability to maintain control. Another similarity 
between social control by institutions and control within a domestic relationship is the use 
of isolation. Foucault cites the view of 18th century theorists of punishment that, in 
isolation, the person would turn his or her thoughts inward and “rediscover in the depths of 
his conscience the voice of good [… in] an exercise in spiritual conversion” (ibidem: 122). 
Clearly, in abusive relationships, it is not “the voice of good” that is intended to guide the 
abused person’s thinking and behavior, but the voice of the abuser. Nevertheless, the 
principle remains the same: a voice that seems to belong to an authoritative other (be it 
God, or the abusive relationship partner) is internalized, and the result of internalization 
appears as a “conversion.” 
Once someone has internalized the voice of external authority, it can be exceptionally 
difficult for him or her to even recognize that voice as distinct from the thoughts and 
desires of the “true self,” let alone resist it. Foucault explains this phenomenon by 
observing that the disciplined individual “becomes the principle of his own subjection”; he 
or she takes on the role of monitoring his or her own behavior to make sure it conforms to 
“the rules” and thereby assumes dual roles, both prisoner and jailer (ibidem: 202-203). 
This is an advantage for those who would control an intimate partner because, as a sort of 
outsourcing from the abuser’s point of view, it lessens the amount of power that needs to 
be exerted. It is, at the same time, a disadvantage for the controlled because any eventual 
liberation on their part will be experienced as fighting against their own desires. The 
obvious economy of time and effort that discipline requires of the controller means also 
that disciplinary powers may be “de-institutionalized,” to use Foucault’s term; they are 
easily adapted into methods of control that can be used within families, or exerted through 
technologies like cell phones, rather than face-to-face (ibidem: 211, 215). The reason this 
adaptation is so easy, Foucault remarks, is that “disciplines […] bring into play the power 
                                               
11
 In her analysis of the links between Foucauldian theory and domestic violence, Andrea Westlund 
notes that the point about control over women being like Foucault’s discipline has also, influentially, 
been made by Sandra Bartky (Westlund, 1999: 1045). 
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relations […] as discreetly as possible,” through similarity to expected romantic and/or 
caring behaviors (ibidem: 220). 
Now that disciplinary principles of internalization and self-monitoring are so pervasive, 
some readers of Foucault on social control theory interpret him as saying that there is no 
way out of these systems of control. However Foucault himself points to a possible means 
of escape in the course of discussing what disciplinary power must suppress in order to 
be effective. He notes that disciplinary tactics “must neutralize the effects of counter-
power that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to 
dominate,” and identifies “counter-power” as “anything that may establish horizontal 
conjunctions” (ibidem: 219). This observation suggests that effective resistance – against 
institutional discipline or a controlling and abusive relationship partner – can be 
constructed in non-hierarchical networks that promote solidarity and the kind of politically-
aware sharing of personal experiences that earlier generations of feminists labeled 
“consciousness-raising.” Foucault commentator Andrea Westlund makes this point also, 
arguing that “[b]ecause they use a marginalized group’s experiences and testimony to 
destabilize oppressive norms, battered women’s shelters and grass-roots anti-domestic 
violence programs are subversive in their activities” (Westlund, 1999: 1056). “[S]uch anti-
domestic violence programs,” she concludes, “constitute local sites of resistance, in 
something very like the Foucauldian sense” (ibidem: 1057). I think it is quite possible that 
these programs might also provide the concrete experiences that Hirschmann calls for as 
an expansion of political philosophy’s theorizing of liberty. Having access to a social space 
in which one can share stories about what one has experienced and how one has reacted 
can inspire all of the participants to enlarge their horizons of possibility. That is, such 
spaces can become sites of shared resistance, revealing not just momentary breaks in the 
disciplinary power that abuse survivors are manipulated by, but also the solidarity that 
Fanon argues must be built through collective decolonizing actions by colonial natives if 
they are to liberate themselves from the violence and inequality imposed by the colonial 
settlers. 
While Westlund characterizes the explicit bullying and control techniques employed by 
abusers as more consistent with pre-modern, pre-“disciplinary” techniques of power, she 
does acknowledge that, typically, “[t]he proximity of the battered woman to her assailant 
allows for a degree of close surveillance not possible in pre-modern relations” (ibidem: 
1048). It is this surveillance, she says, “which lends to domestic violence a certain 
resemblance to the type of power exercised in modern disciplinary institutions” (ibidem). 
Westlund’s position that overt bullying is “pre-modern” in the Foucauldian sense merely 
serves to underscore the modern, disciplinary nature of cell phone texting as an exercise 
of power. Like Ferraro and Hirschmann, Westlund also connects heterosexual battering, 
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at least in part, to “some of the gender norms that modern institutions themselves 
inculcate – a particular kind of nuclear family, for example, characterized by a gendered 
division of labor, roles, authority, and sexual and political identities” (ibidem: 1050). The 
ability of controlling behaviors to mimic, or camouflage themselves among, caring 
behaviors and gender norms makes it particularly difficult to inoculate people against 
abusive relationships; everything in our social conditioning reinforces the notion that we 
should seek relationships in which our partners display interest in our plans and activities, 
and that we should demonstrate our reciprocal emotional commitments by appreciating 
their interest in us and fostering our own interest in their lives. Especially when this 
conditioning is coupled with a belief that men should take charge and/or assume a 
protective role in their relationships with female partners, it can be very difficult to 
distinguish growing romantic interest from the warning signs of a controlling personality.  
Failure to make this link between the phenomenology of intimate partner violence and 
the ways that Fanon, Foucault, and the feminist theorists I have been discussing theorize 
power relations not only makes it difficult to see an unhealthy relationship for what it is 
when one is in it, but also gives rise to the puzzle so many bystanders are so quick to 
verbalize – why doesn’t she leave? One preliminary response to this question is to stress 
that leaving is a dangerous and complex process that often requires multiple attempts. As 
Nancy Hirschmann remarks in her analysis of how theories of liberty need to adapt to 
accommodate real-world problems like domestic violence, “what may appear to be 
complicity [… or] internalization of abuse, […] may in reality be a form of resistance, 
management, or just plain survival” (Hirschmann, 1996: 140). But the fact that individuals 
appear to choose to stay in relationships that we all know – in abstraction – are not 
healthy ones does seem to many to be complicity. I think it is this presumption of 
complicity that encourages people who claim to endorse a “pro-life” politics to be so 
cavalier about the violence and psychological deterioration that abuse victims face. 
Staying equals complicity, and complicity collapses into full responsibility, so – in this 
worldview in which judgment fills the space that empathy and sensitivity to complicating 
factors might otherwise occupy – the victim brought the misery on herself; she is to blame. 
And because she is to blame, she does not (entirely) deserve to be protected. 
The lack of awareness many bystanders have about intimate partner violence (and 
other processes of colonization and social control, for that matter) is noted, and cynically 
exploited by many who direct the political discourse of the United States. For them, the 
ideal citizen is not inspired by the politics of “life” (as in pro-life) but by the politics of fear. 
Fearful people are easier to control, so dealing with them (producing them) secures one’s 
grip on power, but one needs credible threats in order to nurture that fear. A widespread 
culture of violence against women is therefore tolerated by those who might otherwise 
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legislate protection – because it serves their interests. The only effective way to change 
this is to deploy the decolonization strategies Fanon recommends to build solidarity 
among members of society.  
This has to be a grassroots policy of building community beyond the truncated public 
sphere designated as the political space of the nation, much like the consciousness-
raising communities and non-hierarchical networks that might liberate us from 
Foucauldian social control. In essence it refuses colonization, and the hysteria that the 
politics of fear seeks to inculcate, by doing an end-run around the official, legitimized 
sphere in which citizens are invited to endorse the existing power structure and instead 
building more inclusive discursive spaces peopled by supportive community members. My 
own experiences with this decolonizing, horizontal counter-power revolve are taking place 
these days on the college campus. They include organizing “Take Back The Night” 
ceremonies in which each participant offers his or her commitment to specific actions that 
will end domestic violence and sexual assault; working with male allies in the student 
population to develop peer-driven bystander intervention education strategies designed to 
shift the cultural norms to an intolerance for non-consensual sex that is consistent with the 
values of the university community; providing advocacy and encouragement to female 
students who are banding together to support each other in the effort to develop healthy 
body images and a greater sense of self-esteem; and developing a faculty and staff 
network that portrays a view of feminism that contests the vicious stereotype so pervasive 
in American culture of the hate-filled, humorless totalitarian who wants to destroy all of the 
institutions and ideals that comprise American civilization. Other examples of grassroots 
consciousness-raising and solidarity are increasingly present on the internet – most 
notably, the creative, provocative, and therapeutic “Who Needs Feminism?” Tumblr 
(http://whoneedsfeminism.tumblr.com) – and embodied in the global dance party that was 
One Billion Rising, the February 14 (Valentine’s Day) outpouring of human energy to end 
violence against women. These coalitions of people who choose to see ourselves – and 
demand to be seen by others – as survivors and resisters, instead of victims, will be the 
spaces in which we can nurture the movements we will need in every community, in every 
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